systemsfailed.devfailure archive
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Failure class

Cascading failure

One component's failure overloads its neighbors until the system folds.

17 incidents on record

GitHub2026-07-19/4 h 50 min

Expired internal SSL cert breaks Actions runner connectivity

Self-hosted and larger GitHub Actions runners worldwide could not connect for nearly 5 hours, delaying or failing workflow jobs, while the resulting reconnection surge briefly degraded API Requests, Issues, and Pages with added latency and elevated error rates.

Lesson

Certificate expiration is a fully predictable failure mode, so renewal must be automated with independent expiry monitoring, and reconnect paths need circuit breakers so a recovering fleet of clients doesn't stampede shared APIs on its way back up.

Cloudflare2025-09-12/~1 h 15 min (two impact windows)

Dashboard bug overwhelmed auth API for 75 minutes

Cloudflare's dashboard was fully unavailable and its APIs experienced two separate periods of severe degradation for roughly 75 minutes, affecting all customers attempting to make configuration changes.

Lesson

Services sitting in the critical authorization path for all API requests need staged rollouts with automatic rollback and substantial capacity headroom — a single client-side loop bug can generate enough traffic to collapse authentication for an entire platform.

incident.io2025-10-20/~10h 30min (07:11–17:37 UTC, multiple services)

AWS us-east-1 outage cascaded through four hidden third-party dependencies

incident.io's on-call notifications were delayed for over two hours, SAML authentication was intermittently unavailable, Scribe's AI note-taker was offline for ~5 hours, and the deployment pipeline was blocked — all driven by AWS us-east-1 dependency propagation through their telecom provider, auth provider, transcription provider, and Docker Hub.

Lesson

Third-party provider risk runs much deeper than your direct dependencies — audit not just which services you integrate with but which cloud provider each one runs on, and verify that your deployment pipeline itself has no implicit dependencies on the same failing infrastructure you need to fix.

AWS2024-07-30/~7 h

Kinesis cell manager mistakes healthy hosts for dead

For nearly seven hours in US-EAST-1, an internal Kinesis Data Streams cell degraded, raising latencies and error rates across CloudWatch Logs, S3 event delivery, Data Firehose, ECS, Lambda, Redshift, and Glue, with log backlogs taking until the next day to clear.

Lesson

An automated placement or failover system validated against typical workloads can still misbehave on a skewed profile — test cluster-management automation against shard-count extremes, not just throughput extremes, and cap its reaction rate so a false health signal cannot trigger a redistribution storm.

GitHub2024-10-11/19 h 12 min

Database Migration Cascades Into Site-Wide DNS Outage

A single-site DNS outage degraded IDE code completions for 4% of Copilot users, delayed 25% of Actions workflows by over 5 minutes, and caused a complete code search outage for roughly 4 hours.

Lesson

A quick mitigation for a localized infra failure can silently break cross-site connectivity elsewhere, so any DNS or routing fix should be validated for its effect on the broader topology before being treated as the resolution.

AWS2023-06-13/3h 48m

Lambda Frontend Scaling Bug Breaks US-EAST-1

A latent bug in Lambda's Frontend scaling logic degraded function invocations in one cell of US-EAST-1 for nearly four hours, causing elevated errors and latency across STS, Management Console, EKS cluster provisioning, Connect, and EventBridge.

Lesson

Autoscaling systems can hide defects that only trigger past capacity levels never previously exercised in production, so scaling logic must be tested well beyond historical peak, not just up to it.

incident.io2023-09-19/~1 week

GKE Dataplane V2 CPU starvation from concurrent TCP storms

incident.io experienced intermittent Postgres and Memcache connection timeouts across production nodes for approximately one week following their migration to GKE, affecting API response reliability for all customers.

Lesson

After migrating to a new cloud platform, probe for hidden per-node networking behaviors (like Dataplane V2 CPU amplification on connection churn) before blaming application-layer connection pools — node-level packet drops can mimic dozens of unrelated app failures at once.

CircleCI2021-11-08/53 min

Backwards-incompatible schema change stalls all job execution

All job executors were blocked from running customer jobs for roughly 53 minutes, with elevated queue times continuing for machine executors for over an hour longer, affecting all CircleCI customers.

Lesson

A rollback is not automatically safe when a schema or format change has already been written to storage in the new shape — verify backward AND forward read compatibility before treating rollback as the safe default.

Datadog2020-09-24/~10 h

Service discovery collapse took down all systems for 10 hours

The US region of Datadog was degraded for roughly 10 hours on September 2425, 2020, with the web tier hitting 6090% error rates, leaving customers unable to reliably access dashboards, alerts, APM, or infrastructure monitoring.

Lesson

Service discovery and configuration systems must serve stale data gracefully when overloaded rather than failing hard — any system that grapples for a central dependency at startup turns a localized failure into a platform-wide thundering herd.

CircleCI2015-10-14/~17 h

Database contention triggers day-long build queue collapse

Linux builds were backed up or completely halted for roughly 17 hours across two days, affecting nearly all CircleCI customers' CI/CD pipelines during peak usage.

Lesson

Investing in architecture to reduce a known failure mode isn't enough — also build and rehearse the operational tooling needed to intervene quickly when that failure mode recurs at larger scale.

GitHub2014-01-08/42 min full outage + 1 h 35 min partial

Puppet bug corrupted DNS and cascaded into fileserver exhaustion

GitHub.com was fully unavailable for 42 minutes on January 8, 2014, with an additional 95 minutes of degraded access for a subset of repositories while fileservers were triaged and restored.

Lesson

Deployment systems that regenerate critical infrastructure config (like DNS zone files) must validate API responses for completeness before applying them — and must never depend on the very service they are rebuilding.